# The Exploit Intelligence Project

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


### Intro and Agenda

- Talk series discussing intelligence-driven security
  - Provide actual data on attacker characteristics
  - Provide analysis tradecraft to analyze it
    - Intrusion kill chains
    - Attacker characterization
    - Adversarial attack graphs
- Informed defense is more effective and less costly
  - Less hypothetical, more verifiable
  - Defenses supported by observation
  - "Technology doesn't beat determination"



#### Let's Talk About Vulnerabilities





# How many vulnerabilities did you have to pay attention to avoid SpyEye, Zeus, Gozi, Clampi, etc?








# What are we doing wrong?



#### Maslow's Internet Threat Hierarchy



#### Mass Malware

How does it work?

### Gain Exposure



#### **Malicious Ads**




**Friends** 

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#### SEO



**SQL** Injection


### Weaponize Capabilities














# Establish Delivery Network






# **Exploit Targets**














### **Install Malware**

Analysis	Hash Search	Statistics	FAQ	About
	analy:	me to VirusTrap client ar tes files with 25 antivirus he terms.	rea. VirusTrap is a com engines. If you are a n	mercial service which ew customer make sure you
	Upload File	Servi	ce Load	
	URL Analysis			
	Options: Sv	witch to SSL ?		
VirusTi	rap © 2009 News - Contac		rms of Service & Privac	y Policy

	C =	
	Spy Eye	2 414
		11.4
W+ 00- 14	P. C.	_
MainCPs.txt Collectors.txt	maincps.txt collectors.txt	
Encryption key	Your Enc. Key	
Connector interval (sec)	300	
Kill Zeus:	☐ Jabber Notification	
Clear cookies and sessions:		
Brute-force certificates:	☐ Auto-Spreading	
Log only important (https) URL's:	☐ Auto-Update	
Compress with Unique Stub Generator:		
Enable screenshot configuration:	□	
[ WebInjects ]	[ ScreenShots ]	1



#### **Establish Command and Control**






### Perform Actions on Objectives

















Leads to Cyber Pompeii

#### The Intrusion Kill Chain

- Systematic process that an intrusion must follow
  - Deficiency in one step will disrupt the process
- Evolves response beyond point of compromise
  - Prevents myopic focus on vulnerabilities or malware
  - Identifies attacker reuse of tools and infrastructure

- Guides our analysis and implementation of defenses
  - Align defenses to specific processes an attacker takes
  - Force attackers to make difficult strategic adjustments



# Spy vs Spy

Expose Blacklists, Categorization Millions of Infected Sites Weaponize Thousands of Vulnerabilities IDS, Patches, Secure Code Deliver Thousands of IPs **Blacklists** Exploit ??? Tens of Applications Install AV Millions of Malware Samples



???

Thousands of IPs




 $C_2$ 


???

Blacklists, IDS, DLP

# Going on the Offensive



# Exploit Kit Popularity (Q1 2011)





#### Collected Data Sources

- Blackhole
- Bleeding Life
- CrimePack
  - 3.1.3, 3.0, 2.2.8, 2.2.1
- Eleonore
  - 1.6, 1.4.4, 1.4.1, 1.3.2
- Fragus
- JustExploit
- Liberty
  - 2.1.0, 1.0.7

- LuckySploit
- Phoenix
  - 2.5, 2.4, 2.3, 2.2, 2.1, 2.0
- SEO Sploit pack
- Siberia
- Unique Pack
- WebAttacker
- YES
- Zombie



### Mapping of Kits to Exploits + Metadata

#### Phoenix Exploit Kit

- CVE-2009-0836
- CVE-2009-0927
- CVE-2009-1869
- CVE-2010-0188
- CVE-2010-0840
- CVE-2010-0842
- CVE-2010-1297
- CVE-2010-1818
- CVE-2010-1885
- CVE-2010-2883

Affected Vendor: Apple

Affected Product: Quicktime

Type: Memory Corruption

Bypasses: DEP, ASLR

Discovered: 08/30/2010

By: Ruben Santamarta

MSF: 08/30/2010

MSF Rank: Great

ExploitDB-14843


OSVDB-67705

Zero Day Initiative? No

**Discovery Location? Whitehat** 




# Targets Attacked (2010)






# Vulnerability Origin (2009-2010)





# **Effective Analysis**



#### **Evaluate Your Defenses**

- Intelligence gives us data to evaluate our defenses and verify they work as intended
- Jan 1, 2009 what can we put in place to mitigate all exploits for the next two years?
  - Restrictions: no patching allowed
  - There are ALWAYS more bugs
- Corporate Desktop circa 2009
  - Internet Explorer 7, Firefox 3.0
  - Adobe Reader 9, Java, Quicktime, Flash, Office 2007
  - Windows XP SP3



# Effective Defenses (2009-2010)

Memory Corruption (19)		
Defeated by DEP	14	
Defeated by ASLR	17	
Defeated by EMET	19	

	Logic Flaws (8)	
	No Java in Internet Zone	4
	No EXEs in PDFs	1
<b>ISE</b>	No Firefox or FoxIt Reader	2

# The Myth of Sophistication

"I don't presume that a bug discovered by a researcher can't be exploited by malware writers. Some are very capable."

# DEP Bypasses (2009-2010)

Reader	CoolType SING	APT
Reader	libTIFF	APT
Flash	newfunction	APT
Java	getSoondBank	Kſ
Quicktime	_Marshaled_pUnk	reversemode



# Logic Flaws


Java	Calendar Deserialization	Sami
Java	Trusted Method Chaining	Sami
Java	WebStart	Tavis
Java	URI Argument Injection	Tavis
IE	Help Center XSS	Tavis
FoxIt	Auth Bypass	Didier
Reader	PDF Social Engineering	Colin
Firefox	SessionStore	moz_bug_r_a4

# The Myth of Sophistication

DEP Bypasses (5)		
Developed by APT	3	
Developed by Whitehats	2	
Developed by Malware Authors	0	

	Logic Flaws (8)		
	Discovered by APT	0	
	Discovered by Whitehats	8 (!)	
<b>ISE</b>	Discovered by Malware Authors	0	

### Public Exploit Code Preferred






#### The Defender's Dilemma?


Defending successfully is making no mistakes.

Don't make mistakes and you won't get hacked, guaranteed.

### Basic Browser Attack Graph



### Attack Graph Traversals (2009-2010)





### Intelligence-Driven Conclusions

- Start making vaccines and fighting your adversaries
  - Find their resource constraints and attack them!
  - Benchmark your defenses against attack data
  - Create and maintain an attacker's dilemma
- Mass Malware Authors Case Study
  - Can't write exploits and rely on public disclosures
  - Can't evade simple defensive techniques
  - Choose predictably easy targets



#### Related Work

- UCSD, Oakland 2011 Holistic Analysis of Spam
  - "Click Trajectories: End-to-End Analysis of the Spam Value Chain"
- Mike Cloppert, ICIW 2011 Holistic Analysis of APT
  - "Intelligence-Driven Computer Network Defense Informed by Analysis of Adversary Campaigns and Intrusion Kill Chains"
- Dino Dai Zovi, SOURCE Boston 2011 Attack Graphs
  - "Attacker Math 101"
- Microsoft, SRD Blog Exploit Mitigations
  - "Mitigating Software Vulnerabilities" Whitepaper

